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BLACK ADDER DISRUPTORS
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T

his article reports on an empirical research and development project conducted in collaboration by researchers
at University of Genoa, Italy, and Johns
Hopkins University, United States. It is a
progress report summarizing one element of
a broader effort that is intended to provide
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators with reliable, open-source information
to assist in the development of low-order munitions disruptors. Providing operators the
information necessary to make energetic tools
not only reduces cost but can also circumvent
the restrictions and delays that often complicate the import of disruptor components.
MUNITION DISRUPTORS
The disruptors described here use an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) to breach
a munitions’ casing and initiate a burn of the
high-explosive fill. The burn may consume the
entire explosive content but more often leads
to a deflagration, a partial detonation, or a full
detonation. It is accepted that there is always a
risk of high order detonation of the target munition so these disruptors are only used when
a full detonation would be an acceptable, if
undesirable, outcome.
The penetrator is formed by the detonation of an explosive charge inside the disruptor body in contact with a specifically shaped
liner. This has the effect of focusing increased
energy toward the target upon detonation, as
first noted by Munroe in 1888. This phenomenon was extensively studied and exploited for use in the design of weapon systems
and in explosive tunneling procedures. It
was found, for example, that the geometry of
the liner shape is critical for armor penetration and that adding other elements such as
wave shapers inside the charge can further
increase the concentration of the detonation
forces. Complex liner designs are not believed
to be necessary for munitions disruption purposes for which the liner is generally a simple, shallow cap of metal. On detonation of
the disruptor, the liner collapses inward and
is projected under immense pressure toward
the target. Upon penetration of the target, the
energy released should start a fire in the highexplosive (HE) content. If it burns too fast,
the explosive will detonate. If it burns too
slowly, the fire will be extinguished and the
munition left hazardous.

The Black Adder disruptor.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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Figure 1. EFP Disruptor components.
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Figure 2. The Black Adder body is designed to control variables
during testing.

Experimental liners.

A commonly used munition disruptor liner is a shallow cap of pressed
copper, commonly called the Baldric. Alternatives that are intended to
increase the probability of low-order neutralization success use pressedsheet magnesium in place of copper.
To provide controls by which to measure success, we used simple
liners of copper and magnesium. Without the time or resources to approach this with the disciplined theoretical rigor that may have been
ideal, we then used an informed but informal approach to design new
disruptor liners that would be low-cost, easy to make, and more reliable
than those commonly used. Strictly controlling variables in empirical
testing allowed rapid progress to be made.

EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY ONE
The use of a clear, acrylic body was novel. To discover whether its failure to confine the detonation in the same manner as a steel body would
cause problems, we carried out our first series of eight disruptor blast
tests against inert targets.
The tests included a control to allow comparison between a standard,
steel-cased Baldric disruptor and the acrylic-bodied Black Adder disruptor. Both had simple, copper-cap liners, the same stand-off and the
same HE charge. The Black Adder liner penetrated the target to a greater depth and with a larger, cleaner hole than the control. It was also
observed, as an incidental benefit, that the Black Adder body burned
up without fragmentation, which made it less hazardous in use than a
steel body.
We went on to try several liner designs but, with no reliable way of recording the spread of the liner material inside the inert target, we were
not able to learn enough to make any informed comparison between the
various liner behavior after entry.

CONTROLLING VARIABLES
It is known that disruptor reliability can be affected by the presence
of air voids in the HE used to fill the disruptor in the field. It can also
be affected by the distance between the disruptor and the target, and by
the positioning of the detonator in relation to the liner. To control these
variables during testing, we designed the simple disruptor body shown
(see Figure 2).
This Black Adder body design is expensive when compared to using
an off-cut of plumping pipe and wire. It was designed to control variables in liner testing rather than provide a disruptor body that is cheap
to make in the field. It was our intent to control other variables as strictly as practicable so that the only variable that could alter the outcome
would be the new design of liner we made.
All liners were designed to penetrate at least 10 mm of steel and deliver a payload that encourages the HE to burn. Some liner designs were
highly speculative as we experimented with geometry, shaping materials, and fire-inducing payloads in a way that was intended to provide an
indication of which liner would be worth continued testing.
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EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY TWO
Day two involved testing two control and eight unproven liner designs
against inert targets. A witness piece that would provide a useful comparison of liner designs without using live munitions was devised and placed
inside a length of 5 mm steel box section with a 5 mm steel plate on top.
This arrangement required the new liner to penetrate 10 mm of steel before entering the witness piece, which then provided a useful record of the
intensity and spread of burning material inside the target.
In two series of five disruptor blasts, the effects of eight unproven liners and two controls were recorded. The HE available to charge the disruptors had a lower velocity of detonation than in the original test, but
the results in the series would still be valid for comparison because the
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Disruptor being used against an inert target.

The witness pieces provided a valuable, permanent record of the impact and the spread of material inside the targets.

charge was uniform within that test series.
Analysis of the results allowed two of the experimental liner designs to be discarded and
the remaining six to be ranked in order of
what was believed to be their potential to produce the desired effect.

Witness piece.

Setup showing five Black Adders prepared to fire.

EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY THREE
On day three, tests of the remaining experimental liners against live munitions was conducted. Generally, there is a greater chance of
causing a detonation with small munitions
because the point of attack with the disruptor
will always be close to the fuze. Test articles

for this series were 82 mm HE mortars that
had been recently manufactured. Being factory fresh was a detail that we hoped would ensure consistency among targets.
In each test, the feet of the Black Adder disruptor were taped in the same position on the
target, and care was taken to ensure that the
standoff, charge weight, and depth of detonator insertion were identical.
The copper control liner was used twice
and, in both cases, the projectile penetrated
both sides of the mortar casing without causing a burn or a detonation. This showed too
much penetration and was an unsatisfactory
result; the mortars were later destroyed using
explosive donor charges.
The magnesium control liner was used
twice and produced different results. In one
instance, the mortar burned out and was
thrown more than 100 meters away. In the
other, the munition deflagrated. Both results
were good, and the result provides evidence
in support of the claim that a pressed magnesium cap has advantages. But the results
showed inconsistency.
Four different Black Adder liner designs
were then tested (two liner designs remain
untested due to lack of range time). When a
liner performed well, the test was repeated to
ensure that the result had a good chance of
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82 mm HE mortar bombs.

A charged Black Adder ready to fire.

Burned out mortar shell (left) and deflagrated munition (right).

An improvised and low-cost disruptor body with
all of the variable control features of those used
in our tests.
New liner one: mortar left in a hazardous condition.

New liner two: deflagrated mortar (left) and burned out mortar shell (right).

New liner three: in both mortars, the HE burned to deflagration.
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New liner four: an ideal result with all HE burned and no fragmentation.

being replicated. If a liner did not demonstrate the desired low-order
disruption, it was not selected for additional tests.

continue as support permits, and we hope that a conclusion of value to
field operatives can be published soon.

NEW LINER ONE
In the first test using one of our experimental designs of liner, the
munition was penetrated and some of the explosive filling had burned;
there was no deflagration and the fuze was left in place. As this was an
unsatisfactory result, the liner was set aside.

See endnotes page 67
We owe a debt of gratitude to Ben Remfrey, Phil Jowett, and the staff
of the EOD and Demining School at MAT Kosovo who coordinated access to demolition consumables and test range support.1 The MAT Kosovo
staff were able to arrange and oversee blast testing with a professional
flexibility and patience that was greatly appreciated. We recommend the
MAT Kosovo R&D support capacity to all researchers in humanitarian
mine action.
Thanks also to the management and staff of the POLIEX factory and
range in Berane, Montenegro.2 The authors also wish to acknowledge varied useful inputs and advice from Cris Chellingsworth, United Kingdom.

NEW LINER TWO
In the first test with liner two, the HE burned and increased pressure inside the mortar and blew off the fuze, leaving some unburned
explosive loose inside an intact casing. In the second test with this
liner, the munition def lagrated. This was a result very similar to that
achieved with the magnesium control liner. Both results were good,
but inconsistent.
NEW LINER THREE
In both tests with liner three, the mortar deflagrated cleanly and a
small amount of unburned HE was expelled. This was almost the best
result possible and showed consistency.
NEW LINER FOUR
In both tests with liner four, the mortar completely burned out with
no deflagration. This was the best possible result and showed consistency; it was also where we ran out of time.
DISCUSSION
The test results demonstrate that using a disruptor liner to deliver
a payload that encourages the explosive content to burn can have advantages in terms of effectiveness and consistency when compared with
simple, metal cap-liners. Results suggest which liners performed best,
but the test set was small and the limited number of tests meant that the
liners included payload and architecture variables that need to be explored further. For example, the geometry of liner four is complex and
may not need to be if it was actually the unique payload that achieved the
desired low-order effects.
Referring back to our goals, the experimental liner materials selection criteria required that they be low-cost and not subject to shipping
controls. The liners and payload ingredients could be imported without
restriction or self-manufactured in any area of need. Some liner architecture is complex, and it is highly probable that similar results can be
achieved with liner designs that would be much easier to make. After
one or more proven liners have been selected for further development,
the improvisation of disruptor bodies using large medical syringes or
similarly locally-sourced material will be explored.
These results are encouraging and provide a limited set of results
from which to refine the designs for further empirical testing. Only after
repeated trials with consistent results will similar tests prove anything
compelling about any individual liner shape or payload. This work will
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